Eternal Ulysses

September, 433 BC

Corinth intercepted the news that Corcyra had dispatched ambassadors to Athens. Delegations from both cities arrived in the city at the same time, and Thucydides has both sides presenting their case on the same day. The ambassadors from Corcyra addressed the crowded Athenian assembly first. The Corcyraeans plainly acknowledged their situation: they had thusfar maintained a policy of avoiding alliances, and here they were, hat in hand asking for an alliance on the eve of a second attack by Corinth. They had to answer the question: How does this benefit Athens?

They started by asserting that they had not been the ones who started the war, which was technically true. Corinth, the aggressor, had refused arbitration, declared war, and attacked Corcyra first. They attributed their policy of avoiding alliances as an error in judgement, not out of any dislike or ill will for Athens. They were not a member of either league. Now, however, they clearly saw the error of their ways. Corcyra would be a strong ally; they had successfully defeated the first Corinthian fleet, but with Corinth recruiting rowers from across Hellas (some Athenian), Corcyraean strength was staged to be overwhelmed by Corinthian gold. If Athens came to their aid now, they would receive the lasting gratitude and goodwill of the Corcyraean people. 

War with Sparta was imminent, or so they claimed. If Corinth were to take Corcyra, and fold her fleet into theirs, Athens would no longer be the dominant naval power in Hellas. This naval dominance, more than anything else, was the source of Athen’s ability to maintain her empire. Having any serious rival at sea posed a threat to this status quo, and all the benefits and wealth that it brought to the city. The Corcyraean envoy’s pitch was that it was better to add Corcyraean fleet to Athen’s ranks rather than see those ships added to Corinth’s, and Corcyra’s strategic position between Hellas and the Western Mediterranean would be influential in the coming war.

The Corinthian ambassador had perhaps a more difficult task of countering this hard logic. First, they attacked the Corcyraean’s position of who bore responsibility for the conflict. Corinth had been provoked by the attack of the Corinthian settlers at Epidamnus. Corcyra had refused to aid the Epidamnians, aristocrat or democrat, until Corinthian aid had reached the city. They claimed that the Corcyraean offer of arbitration was insincere –had they wanted to avoid violence they could have proposed arbitration without besieging the city. Instead, they only sought a diplomatic avenue once it was clear that Corinth would respond.

They accused the Corcyraeans of compelling the trade that passed by her island, using their navy as the enforcer for a protection racket on the Ionian Sea. If Corcyra truly respected the Athenians, they would have entered some form of treaty with them when they were the stronger party, not the weaker. Corcyra, off by themselves, avoided alliances so they could act whenever and however they wanted. This was not to avoid politics but to maintain the independence of their racketeering. Corinth’s point was that Corcyra was untrustworthy, and if Athens allied with her, they could expect her to act selfishly.

Corinth, however, did have history with Athens. When the island of Samos rebelled against Athens the other powers of the Peloponnesian League had wanted to support the rebellion. Corinth intervened on Athen’s behalf, maintaining a policy of non-interference in affairs that involved subject cities. Furthermore, before the Persian War Corinth had given Athens twenty ships to aid in their conquest of Aegina. Besides appealing to the assemblies’ reason, Corinth was calling in favors.

War with Sparta was not guaranteed, but allying with Corcyra would guarantee a war with Corinth. The Athenian citizens should not sacrifice peace with the other great powers for a temporary advantage that would pull them all into war. If they did, Athens would discover how many of their subject cities were ready to break into revolt. The Corinthian envoys were confident; they even had the audacity to suggest that Athens join them against Corcyra. How could the Athenians seriously consider the Corcyraean alliance, understanding the scale of the war that would follow?

Athen’s empire had been built with the arms of Athenian Rowers – and each rower had the right to speak just much as any hoplite or aristocratic cavalryman. For the past ten years Athens had genuinely strived to maintain peace. Wars were expensive, in gold and in lives, and Athens remains unique that the men who would fight and die in a coming war had the right to make the decision themselves. The general opinion was that Corinth had made a better argument, there was no close feeling between Athens and Corcyra. But the Corcyraeans had astutely highlighted Athen’s vulnerability. Sparta and Corinth may not want war with Athens, but if Corinth were to become the dominant naval power in Hellas it would invite rebellion throughout the empire. An alliance with Corcyra would certainly mean war with Corinth, at the very least, and it would likely pull in Sparta and the rest of the Peloponnesian League. Debates in the assembly were usually decided within one day — the assembly adjourned without coming to a decision

Heated conversations raged across the city throughout the night. The next day the assembly reconvened. They attempted a middle way: they would agree to a purely defensive alliance; the first record we have of a defensive pact.  Plutarch attributes this plan to Pericles, who undoubtedly had spent the night and morning before whipping votes. They were not at war with Corinth, though many thought that war was unavoidable. The hope was that Corinth would back off, the defensive pact serving as a deterrent. There was the real possibility that the Corcyraeans would not need Athens, they had defeated the first fleet, they may defeat the second.

Athens dispatched a token force of ten triremes, led by Lacedaemonius, the son of the Athenian statesman Cimon. The fleet would have to sail down and around the Peloponnesus to reach Corcyra. Lacedaemonius means Spartan, and his father Cimon had maintained friendly relationships throughout the Peloponnesian League. Athens did not want to arouse any Spartan suspicions. They could have sent a larger force and deterred an attack, or crushed the Corinthian fleet, but the Athenians were genuine in their restraint. They did not want to crush Corinth, only contain them. Lacedaemonius was given strict orders not to engage the Corinthians unless they threatened a landing on Corcyra or one of her colonies. While the assembly had voted for the defensive pact, there was widespread anxiety that war would break out. They quickly suspended the construction projects across the city; it was likely those funds would be needed elsewhere.  

By the time Athens had voted Corinth had finished her preparations: 150 triremes set sail for Corcyra, 90 were from Corinth, 60 were from her allies. They encamped at Chimerium, about twenty miles southeast of Corcyra. Corinth had friendly relationships with the barbarians in the region, and they joined the allied camp. Athen’s ten ships had linked up with the Corcyraeans, and they readied to meet the Corinthian fleet. Corcyra deployed hoplites on shore at Cape Leukimme to oppose any attempted landing, while the fleet prepared to form up in the strait between Corcyra and the Sybota islands along the mainland to the east.

The Corinthian fleet left Chimerium in the middle of the night; their barbarian allies began marching up the coast. They came upon the Corcyraean fleet with the dawn. The Corcyraeans had organized their 110 ships into three squadrons, Lacedaemonius and the Athenian ships were deployed closest to Corcyra, on the far-right flank of the Corcyraean fleet. The Corinthians placed their best sailors and ships on their left flank, to counter the Athenians and Corcyraean right. The center and right flank of the Corinthian fleet was composed of allied Ambracian and Megarian ships, and their line stretched to the coast of the Sybota islands.

Both fleets were carrying large numbers of hoplites and javelin throwers. Both sides sang the paean, the Greek war-chant, and with the thrashing of oars the fleets moved towards each other. In the confined strait the two fleets slammed into each other, bronze prows broke through the wooden hulls of the Greek ships. The oars of ships were sheared off. Maneuver was not the order of the day. It was a land battle at sea. Hoplites and sailors scrambled over the rails and onto enemy decks fighting with spears and swords. Screams and shouted commands filled the air along with javelins and missiles. It was a brawl more than a battle. The Athenians lingered on the edge: Lacedaemonius’ orders were to only engage to prevent a landing. Thucydides does not give us the orders or mind of the Corinthian commander, but they did not attack the Athenians.  

On the other end of the battlefield the Corcyraeans were beginning to break through, and then the Corinthian allies on the right collapsed. Those ships that were able fled south, and the Corcyraean left gave chase. They would reach and plunder the camp at Chimerium, but they had abandoned the fight and now the center was exposed and outnumbered. On the Corcyraean right flank, the Corinthians were winning. These were Corinthian hoplites and sailors, not allies. The hoplites did not slow down in attempting to take prizes or prisoners, they moved from ship to ship, slaughtering as they went. The Corinthians were unaware of the collapse of their right flank, and in the heat and confusion of battle they even began attacking some of their allied ships. The Corcyraean right flank began to crack, ships began pulling back. Lacedaemonius saw that a collapse would be imminent if something was not done. He ordered the Athenian ships to engage.

The Athenian triremes slammed into the side of the Corinthians. It was not enough. The Corcyraean fleet, its left flank completely gone after pursuing the retreating allies, was being massacred. The Corcyraean ships began fleeing back to shore, and the Corinthians gave chase. The men were tired, the battle had been raging for hours, the sea was filled with wrecks and corpses and men frantically trying to stay above water. The Corcyraeans and Athenians reached shore and the Corinthians pulled off. They began tending to their wounded and fishing their dead out of the water. On land, the allied barbarians had secured the Sybota islands. It was growing late in the afternoon. The Corinthians began ferrying their men and prizes to the rendezvous point. The Corcyraeans had been decimated, they had lost two out of every three ships. Out of 110 ships, twenty remained on the battlefield. 

The Corinthian ships sailed back into the strait. They were forming back up for a second course of battle. Hopelessly outnumbered, bloodied and exhausted, Corcyra accepted their challenge. The Athenians sailed out alongside them. Both sides sang the paean once more, the oars struck water, and the ships began rushing towards each other through the wreckage. The Corinthian fleet slammed to a halt. Ships were coming over the horizon to the south; Athens had sent reinforcements! The Corinthian fleet turned back to their new camp on the islands. Corcyra saw the ships as well and began rowing back to Leukimme. The sun was setting. The battle was over.

The second Athenian fleet made their way through the wreckage to Leukimme. After Lacedaemonius had sailed out from Athens the Assembly had worried that they had not sent enough men, and this second fleet of twenty ships had been sent days later. They had come upon the battle having no notion of where the Corinthian fleet was. It had been pure luck.

With the dawn the thirty Athenian ships and the rest of Corcyraean fleet that was still seaworthy sailed out to the harbor at Sybota and lined up for battle. The Corinthians and their allies sailed out and formed up, but they did not advance. Though they had had the better of it the day before, they had not been able to refit their ships overnight. The Corcyraeans had. The Corinthians had taken 2,000 prisoners, but now a sizeable part of their force was occupied guarding them. Worse, the Athenians ships were still fresh, the Corinthians were exhausted. The Corinthians sent out a small boat with a messenger.

The Corinthian boat paddled up towards the Athenians ships. They yelled out that the Athenians were breaking their treaty of peace with Corinth if they blocked them from sailing against Corcyra. The Corcyraeans that could hear them yelled out for the Athenians to kill them. The Athenians responded that they had not broken anything. The Corinthians were free to sail wherever they wished, except for Corcyra. The messenger rowed back to the Corinthian fleet, and they began to row south. The Athenians allowed the Corinthians to leave.

The Corcyraean ships sailed after the floating wrecks and floating dead that had been scattered during the night. The Corcyraeans claimed victory because the Corinthians had refused battle twice and Corcyra had retained the field. The Corinthians claimed victory because they had lost 30 ships, the Corcyraeans had lost 70. On their way back to Corinth they sacked Anactorium and left colonists there. They sold 800 of the Corcyraeans into slavery, but they kept 250 of them, many of them men of high standing. The Corinthians made sure that they were well treated: they would be useful later….